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LETTER

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM PITT, Eſq;

On the Preſent

Negotiations for a PEACE

WITH

FRANCE AND SPAIN.

Animum in Vulnere ponunt. VIRG.

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1762

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LETTER, &c.

SIR,

I CAN addreſs you in no terms more proper than thoſe that are ſometimes made uſe of from the throne, *The eyes of all Europe are upon you*; I ſay of *all Europe*, becauſe the reſolutions of the Britiſh parliament, in which you have ſo extenſive an influence, will, in a great meaſure, decide the fate of the public, whether Great Britain ſhall bend, or endeavour to break the neck of France.

There ſeems, Sir, to be no medium; ſhe has offered to ſubmit to the former; your friends inſiſt upon the latter; they inſiſt that there is no ſafety for our Ame-

rican intereſts ſhould France be allowed to keep a foot of ground on the continent of North America; and that we can have no reparation for the expence this war has put us to, but by a total engroſſment of the fiſh and ſugar trades. This, Sir, is going rather farther than you yourſelf went in the negotiation of 1761; and therefore I cannot figure to myſelf a more proper mediator than yourſelf for allaying thoſe heats, which, if not allayed, may at this time, be fatal to the nation.

If I could, Sir, foreſee where our demands would ſtop, I ſhould by no means be averſe to our ſtretching them to the utmoſt. When our preſent diſputes with France began we had not in our eye a ſingle object, but the aſcertainment of the bounds of Canada. I ſhall paſs no encomiums upon the abilities of the gentlemen who were employed as commiſſaries for that purpoſe. They certainly were far from being equal to their commiſſion; and for want of information, or courage, or both, they gave the French court but too plauſible a handle for trifling with the negotia-

negotiation, and even for repreſenting the arguments and facts to be highly in their favour. Their aſſurance was ſuch, that preſuming upon that evident futility and fribbleriſm (pardon the expreſſion) with which the whole negotiation was conducted, they commenced hoſtilities in North America; and thus ended the prologue and the firſt act of our political drama.

Our making reprizals, by ſeizing the French ſhips without any formal declaration of war, opened the ſecond act, and ſome very diſagreeable incidents, ſuch as the defeat of Braddock, and the taking our forts in America, changed the aſpect of the war greatly to our prejudice. I am far from wanting to revive the remembrance of diſagreeable events; but it is certain, that the ſhameful diſputes that reigned over all the Britiſh intereſts in America confirmed the obſtinacy, and encreaſed the inſolence, of the French, while the check that Byng received in the Mediterranean, and the loſs of Minorca, ſeemed to leave amongſt us no national ſpirit.

Such was the gloomy proſpect when the curtain drew up for the third act of the drama. All that we then wanted was to ſecure our back ſettlements. Security and protection againſt the encroachments of the French was the ultimatum of our deſigns. Not a whiſper tranſpired about Canada, and far leſs about Guadaloupe or Martinico. But the French were incautious enough to unite us by their provocations. Sir William Johnſon beat them; they were driven from their encroachments; they loſt ſome of their capital ſhips, and at laſt Louiſbourg itſelf fell before the Britiſh arms.

Here, Sir, our language was changed; it was not enough that we had ſecured our back ſettlements, unleſs they were defended againſt all poſſibility of any future attack; and this brought on the expedition to Canada; which, give me leave to ſay, and I appeal to the laſt words of the hero, who conducted it, was the worſt concerted but the beſt executed enterprize that ever was undertaken; for had it not been for a moſt miraculous concur-

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rence of accidents, the planners of the expedition, inſtead of being entitled to national honours, muſt have been covered with public diſgrace. But in the fourth act, Sir, I am afraid the laws of the ſtage were violated, becauſe the unity of place was diſregarded; the ſcene was transferred from America to Germany; but by what magic this tranſition was made, you Sir, perhaps can beſt account for. To ſay, that our operations in Germany facilitated our conqueſts in America, is flying in the face of common ſenſe. The French had received their mortal blows in America before the German ſyſtem took place; they had received them during your anti-germanic profeſſions; they were not in a condition to ſend a ſingle battalion to America, from the time that Louiſbourg was taken, to that unfortunate period, when the haughty and offenſive behaviour of a certain great miniſter obliged France and Spain to conclude that family compact, which the ſame great perſonage repreſented to be a meaſure of danger, whereas,

whereas, in fact, it was a precaution for ſelf-defence.

Thus we have ſeen how gradually ſucceſs has extended our views. Inſtead of the humble, defenſive, and indeed prudent, ſcheme of aſcertaining our boundaries, and defending them from encroachments, we annihilated the Dunkirk of America, and laid an empire in the duſt. We thus obtained more than our warmeſt expectations had reached; we might now have bid defiance to the power of France, nor could the gates of hell have prevailed againſt our empire in America; but as Pyrrhus ſaid to his miniſter, *Let us ſtep acroſs the ſea; Martinico and Guadaloupe invite our arms.* But give me leave, Sir, to aſk, to what part of the original ſcheme of ſecurity for our conqueſts do thoſe two iſlands relate; are they not totally foreign to it? They are, it is true, very tempting morſels, and may ſerve to make our merchants as *kings upon the earth.* Is not this a total deviation from our original plan? To thoſe queſtions it

has

has been replied, that we could not otherwiſe have indemnified ourſelves for the vaſt expence the war has coſt us. This manner of reaſoning puts me in mind of your delicate punch drinkers. The firſt glaſs is too weak ; pray add a little more rum to it. — Now it is too ſtrong. — It wants water.—Nay now, indeed, you have made it all water.—Prithee, a little more rum to it.——Thus we go on adding expence upon expence till our views are boundleſs, and every acquiſition induces a neceſſity for another. We attacked and conquered Martinico and Guadaloupe to indemnify ourſelves ; but what indemnifies us for the expences we have been at in thoſe conqueſts? Muſt not another conqueſt be undertaken; and when we have been mad enough to drive the French out of America, at an expence which is twenty times greater than all their property there can ſatisfy, who is to indemnify us for that ?

Let us then attack old France, and let her ſuffer. Would not this be talking like mad men ? But what elſe can we do,

if

if we continue to multiply expences, and conſequently indemnifications.

Having ſaid thus much with regard to France, let us turn our eyes to a more important object, I mean Spain. I ſhall, for argument ſake, take it for granted that we ſucceed before the Havannah; but can that be our ultimate object? Every ſhilling we acquire at the Havannah goes into private pockets, without a farthing of it being brought to account by the government. Does this eaſe our landed intereſt of taxes; does it diminiſh our payments for window-lights and wheel-carriages; will it take off the duties we pay for every manufacture, and for every ingredient that enters into manufactures; will it aboliſh the burdens upon coals, ſoap, ſalt, candles, leather, and a thouſand other articles indiſpenſable to a trading nation; or to ſum up the whole, will the plunder of the Havannah contribute towards the fitting out a ſingle ſhip for its protection, or a ſingle battalion for its defence.

What then is the ultimate end of our attempt upon the Havannah, ſuppoſing it to be ſucceſsful? Undoubtedly our having the treaſures of Peru and Mexico at our devotion. This idea is too romantic to be farther inſiſted on. It confutes itſelf, and were it carried into execution, would in two years undo this country; becauſe it would take from us that ſpirit of induſtry, which has given us more wealth than even Peru and Mexico yielded to the Spaniards; and yet without that ridiculous romantic idea our whole proceedings and ſchemes of accumulating conqueſts are unaccountable.

But, it may be ſaid, we muſt have the Havannah to bridle the Spaniards and overawe their inſolence. Bridle them from what? From bringing wealth and riches into our own ports. The plain truth, is, that we muſt either keep the Havannah or give it back. If we keep it, it muſt be for ſome farther purpoſe, as the place itſelf, intrinſically, even if the whole iſland is thrown into it, cannot pay the expences of garriſoning it; and the charges of the

expedition in conquering it. It ſerves the Spaniards as a noble warehouſe and the key of their navigation, and undoubtedly the treaſure that may be found in it is immenſe, but when it is diverted from thoſe purpoſes, it is of next to no importance to the Britiſh nation.

If the plan of our operations do not extend to a total conqueſt of both the French and Spaniſh America, our conduct is incomprehenſible. Can it be imagined that any people will be hewers of wood and drawers of water for another? Is it in our power to force the Spaniards to dig in the mines of Mexico and Potoſi for us; and if they do not, where is the uſe of our keeping the Havannah? Let us for a moment ſuppoſe that place to be in our hands; we ſhould not be poſſeſſed of it ſix months before a national outcry would be made up on the unwholeſomeneſs of the climate, its diſagreement with Engliſh conſtitutions, and the immoderate expence of maintaining it. This being the caſe, another expedition muſt be ſet on foot to Lima, perhaps and Vera Cruz,

to bring ourselves home, as the saying is, and thus from expedition to expedition we are encouraged to throw at all, till we become masters of the Spanish continent in America.

I shall, Sir, for argument sake, suppose that desireable period to be arrived, what is the consequence? how are we to hold them? Is this nation like the Heruli, the Goths and the Vandals of former times, overstocked with inhabitants? Are we in a capacity to send out our millions to make new conquests, and to people new colonies, and how many millions must we send out before the conquests I speak of could be of service to us to overawe a proud exasperated people, heated with revenge, and animated by despair. Now that I am upon this subject, Sir, I hope you will not take it amiss, if I just express my apprehensions, that we have already gained more conquests than we can make use of to any good purpose. For my own part, considering the nature of the capitulation of Guadeloupe and Martinico, I can by no means discover the infinite advan-

tage either of them can be of, to the inhabitants of Great Britain. The French are in poſſeſſion of their properties; they are entitled to the return of their labours; they trade under our protection; they are exempted from many heavy burdens and oppreſſive taxes they paid to their former maſters, and we need not doubt of their retaining at all times French hearts, ſentiments, and manners.

But, it may be ſaid, they will take off great quantities of our manufactures, they will employ our ſhipping, and we ſhall have the excluſive trade of ſugar. As to our manufactures; I believe the difference in their demand, or rather in their conſumption, will be very inconſiderable, compared to what it was before we conquered thoſe iſlands. Engliſh manufactures will make their way, and find their vent every where even amongſt enemies. We may gueſs pretty ſhrewdly at the efforts of prohibitions, by what we experience in our own country; for I cannot perceive, that there is the ſmalleſt diminution of the conſumption of French commodities amongſt

us ſince the beginning of this war, but in thoſe articles in which our manufactures exceed thoſe of the French. As to the employment of our ſhipping, and conſequently the encreaſe of our navigation, I own myſelf to be a little ſingular on that head. Suppoſing 80,000 hogſheads of ſugar to be annually manufactured in both iſlands, the whole amounts to no more than 20,000 tons, which at a medium may employ 150 ſhips. This, it muſt be admitted, would be a conſiderable encreaſe in our ſhipping, if the caſe was not that our ſugar ſhips from Barbadoes, Jamaica, and our other iſlands, are, one with another, ſeldom above half loaded; and to make up the deficiency, as they undoubtedly will do by loading Guadaloupe ſugars, the encreaſe of ſhipping will be but very trifling, when put in competition with the benefits of peace. With regard to the laſt advantage propoſed, I mean the excluſive ſugar trade, it is a mere chimæra, while the French and Spaniards are in poſſeſſion of Hiſpaniola, and ſo many other places

and iſland where ſugars almoſt ſpontaneouſly grow.

But, Sir, nothing would be more amazing to me than to underſtand, that any of your Weſt-India friends, of whom you have great numbers, ſhould clamour againſt a peace that is to reſtore Guadaloupe and Martinico to the French. Should Great Britain avail herſelf to the utmoſt by the cultivation of ſugars in thoſe iſlands, to what a ſtate, in a few years, muſt our old original iſlands be reduced! Suppoſing that our ſhipping is encreaſed by the acquiſition of thoſe two iſlands, what do we gain, if it is at the expence of our other iſlands? But, Sir, I am in no pain about that conſideration; perhaps the danger they have eſcaped may quicken them to a degree of induſtry, that may more than compenſate for giving back the two iſlands in queſtion. Upon the whole, therefore, I can by no means be ſatisfied, that our retention of thoſe iſlands would at any rate anſwer the expence of continuing the war; and that it might not in a ſhort time be attended with the detriment, if not the utter

ter ruin of our own iſlands, which have hitherto brought, and daily brings in, immenſe riches to this kingdom.

I ſhall now, Sir, proceed to the fifth act of our drama, which is to uſher in the grand cataſtrophe; and it opens with our conqueſt of Martinico; a glory for which your friends ſay we are indebted to your adminiſtration. But the conſequence of that conqueſt has been already diſcuſſed under the head of Guadaloupe; I ſhall therefore only add, that it is unanimouſly agreed amongſt all people in trade, that, however brilliant the conqueſt of Martinico was, it is attended with no ſolid advantage to this nation, if we conſider it ſeparately from Guadaloupe. You, Sir, was willing to give up the kernel, and what ſhall we do with the ſhell? You agreed to reſtore Guadaloupe by the ſixth article of the anſwer you ſent to the ultimatum of France, dated Sept. 1, 1761; and indeed, if we ſeriouſly canvaſs the whole of that negotiation, it does not appear to me, that we were to have the ſmalleſt compenſation for that ceſſion, unleſs

leſs we ſuppoſe the demolition of Dunkirk, and the rendition of Minorca, to be ſuch. As to Dunkirk, I think it is entirely out of the queſtion; the demolition of it was ſtipulated by former treaties; nor do I ſee why it ſhould be an object of terror to us in its preſent condition. As to Minorca, at the time when you offered to cede Guadaloupe, it was ſo far from being of ſervice to us, that it muſt have entailed on us a moſt monſtrous uſeleſs expence. At preſent, the caſe is altered by the family compact, and by our war with Spain, which renders the poſſeſſion of that iſland now extremely deſireable. But, Sir, it would, I believe, puzzle the beſt of your friends to name any one diſadvantage, which the loſs of Minorca put us under before the war with Spain broke out, but that of freeing us from an expence of above 200,000 l. a-year, in maintaining three thouſand men in garriſon, not to mention our immenſe charge in ſhipping, in tranſporting troops, ammunition, and proviſions to and from the iſland, and the coſts of fortifications and repairs, which at a moderate

moderate computation may be eſtimated at 100,000 l. a year more. I ſhall finiſh this head with one obſervation; which is, that no acquiſition can be ſo valuable to the acquirer, as it was to the original owner. Martinico could not have coſt us leſs than ſeven thouſand men to garriſon it, and keep the inhabitants in awe. The French were free of that expence, all but the trifle they paid to the officers for diſciplining their men, which were raiſed upon that and the neighbouring iſlands.

What I have obſerved, with regard to the rendition of Guadaloupe, is applicable to the liberty which the French, by the enſuing treaty, are to have of fiſhing in the gulph of St. Laurence. You, Sir, agree that they ſhould have a port there without fortifications to be ſubject to the inſpection of England, you have granted the French ſubjects the privilege of fiſhing in the gulph of St. Laurence, upon this expreſs condition, that is to ſay; That the ſaid French ſubjects ſhall abſtain from that particular fiſhery on all the coaſts appertaining to Great Britain, whether on

the continent, or on the iſlands ſituated in the ſaid gulph of St. Laurence, which fiſhery the proprietors only of the ſaid coaſts have conſtantly enjoyed, and always exerciſed; ſaving always the privilege granted by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, to the ſubjects of France to fiſh and dry their cod fiſh, on a part ſpecified on the banks of Newfoundland. You likewiſe, Sir, conſented in your maſter's name to cede to the French king the iſle of St. Pierre, which is divided by a little ſtreight from another iſland, known by the name of Miquelon, or Michelon, lying to the north, which iſle of St. Pierre with its port, with reſpect to that part of Newfoundland ſituate between the bay of Placentia, and the bay of La Fortune, ſtands eaſt ſouth eaſt, and its port opens towards the north eaſt, the interior part of which port is called Bourgway.

To the ceſſion of the ſaid iſle the following conditions were annexed; That France, on no pretence, nor under any denomination whatever, ſhall erect any fortifications, either in the ſaid iſle, or in its

its port, and that ſhe ſhall not keep any troops there, nor maintain any military eſtabliſhment whatever. That the ſaid iſle, and the ſaid port, ſhall only ſerve as a ſhelter for the fiſhing veſſels of the French nation, and that France ſhall not ſuffer the veſſels of any other nation whatever to partake of the convenience of this ſhelter for the fiſhing boats. That the poſſeſſion of the iſle of St. Pierre as aforeſaid, ſhall not be conſtrued in any caſe to confer, tranſmit, or participate in any manner whatever, the leaſt right or power of fiſhing, or of drying cod fiſh, in any part of the coaſt of Newfoundland, beyond the diſtrict expreſly ſtipulated and fixed for that purpoſe, by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, that is to ſay, *A loco Cap Bonaviſta nuncupato, uſque ad extremitatem ejuſdem inſulæ ſeptentrionalem, indeque ad latus occidentale recurrendo uſque ad lacum* Pointriche *appellatum*. By the ſucceeding article, an Engliſh commiſſary was to be allowed to reſide on that iſland, and the commander of the Britiſh ſquadron at Newfoundland to be at liberty from time

to time to inſpect the ſaid iſle and the ſaid port, to ſee that the ſtipulations above expreſſed were punctually obſerved.

I have, Sir, been the more explicit with regard to thoſe terms, becauſe it is very poſſible that by this time they are forgotten by the public. It is evident that they are founded upon the treaty of Utrecht, and it is extremely plain, than that if France ſhall preſume to triſle with us, and to make a wrong uſe of the indulgence there granted, which is the common argument with the enemies of peace, nothing can be more eaſy than for us to annihilate the ſame. As the terms of the preliminaries are not yet publiſhed, I am not at liberty to ſay, whether we have, or have not, admitted of the above ſtipulations, and whether the number of ſhips to be employed in this fiſhery are not reſtricted to a certain number. In the mean time, it may not be impertinent to obſerve, that by this ceſſion we give up nothing that properly belongs to ourſelves, and all we do is to reduce the treaty of Utrecht to its primary meaning, without

departing

departing in one tittle from the original principles, upon which we undertook the war. The great queſtion therefore is, whether the giving the French a right to the *feræ naturæ*, a privilege that is not denied even by our lords of the manors, jealous as they are of the game, is of ſuch conſequence, as to perpetuate a war. You yourſelf, Sir, appear plainly to be of opinion that it is not; you thought it inhuman to deprive the French of a privilege, without which, as a people, they cannot ſubſiſt.

Thus far, Sir, I have by the help of your polar ſtar, cleared my way, and ſhewn that we have in reality given up nothing that you yourſelf would not have given up, had Martinico been in our poſſeſſion on the 17th of Auguſt, 1761. It remains then to enquire, whether we have not gained by the new preliminaries, ſuppoſing them to be ſuch as we have in print.

The capital maxim of your negotiation evidently was to ſecure Canada, and to that ſecurity you was willing to ſacrifice Guadaloupe, to which Martinico, however

ever we may boaſt of its importance, is no more than the citadel. But you cannot, Sir, be ignorant of the heart-burnings, the doubts, and difficulties that aroſe upon your leaving them in poſſeſſion of Louiſiana, even ſuppoſing the Marquis de Vandreuil's deſcription of Ganada had taken place, as mentioned in the 2d article of the anſwer of the Britiſh court to the ultimatum of that of France. You may remember, Sir, how copiouſly your friends declaimed upon the happy riddance you met with on that account. Were I to ſpecify the numerous pamphlets and papers that had been publiſhed by them, upon the unfitneſs and danger of leaving the French in poſſeſſion of Louiſiana, they could appear within theſe ſix months to amount to 83. The ſtrong argument urged againſt it, was, the reſtleſs encroaching ſpirit of the French, the arts of their emiſſaries, and their great intereſt amongſt the ſavages, whom they would be perpetually ſtirring up againſt our friends and planters, and ſome of your advocates, or rather the enemies of peace, amongſt whom I could par-

particularly name, ſome of your capital writers, have within theſe ſix weeks, again and again declared, that we had better yield up Martinico and Guadaloupe, with all the neutral iſlands, than leave Louiſiana in the poſſeſſion of the French. They have even gone ſo far as to think, that the entire ceſſion of Canada was of no importance, unleſs we annexed Louiſiana to it. The conveniencies of its rivers, the fertility of its vallies, and its abounding with all kinds of materials for trade and manufactures, have been ſet forth, Sir, in ſo oratorial a manner, that I have been ſometimes tempted to think, that you yourſelf was the penman.

How quickly was the ſtrain altered, when it became next to certain, that Louiſiana was to be ceded to us; all its beauties vaniſhed at once, and left nothing behind them, but uncultivated vallies and dreary mountains. In ſhort, Sir, ſuch is the temper of one ſet of people at this time, that if the French would ſend us a *carte blanche*, on which we were to write our own terms, I don't believe that five men of the

whole

whole party could agree about them. Even your authority, Sir, which our miniſter has copied by giving up Guadaloupe, is deſpiſed and rejected; and if there is a point in which they are agreed, it is to make the terms of peace as inadmiſſible as poſſible to France; or rather to reject all terms.

I am as prepoſſeſſed as any man ought reaſonably to be, in favour both of the cauſe and courage of Britons; and I ſeriouſly think, that at preſent we are ſuperior to the French in the practical part of war, both by ſea and land. I can however by no means admit that ſuperiority to be fixed and permanent. Your own friends, Sir, produce a ſtrong evidence that it is not. According to them, when you took into your hand the ſteerage of ſtate, the French were to us what we are now to them. They beat us in every quarter, and triumphed over us on both elements. I dare not, Sir, flatter you ſo far, as to ſay that it was your eloquence and meaſures alone that rouſed us from our deſpondency. The former was ſeldom heard beyond

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the walls of a certain chappel, and the latter on your outſetting were certainly worſt judged than any of thoſe of your predeceſſors, witneſs the two generals to whom you gave the command of the two moſt important expeditions in the whole war, I mean that againſt Guadaloupe, and that againſt Rochfort. Both of them miſcarried in a moſt unaccountable, not to ſay ſcandalous, manner, and yet, Sir, you eſcaped the blame of both; ſo partial was the public in your favour, or ſo callous were we grown that we did not feel diſgrace. All ſenſation however had not forſaken us; and you had the good fortune to preſide at the cabinet, juſt at the time when we were putting off the old man and putting on the new; or, to ſpeak without a metaphor, when it was plain to his late Majeſty and the other miniſters that the nation could no longer ſuffer the drones of corruption, and the veterans of iniquity, who had long done every thing but fight for their pay, to engroſs the national ſervice. Such was the happy criſis, which we may call the turn of the tide

our affairs, which you took advantage of, and monopolized the merit of it to yourſelf. Notwithſtanding your unfortunate choice of the St. Cas commander, to you was aſcribed the education, the ſpirit and ſucceſs of a Wolfe, a Barrington and a Monckton; tho', God knows, it requires but a very ſmall portion, either of reading, experience, or common ſenſe, to be convinced, that generals of their age are the moſt proper to carry ſuch ſervices, as they performed, into execution.

But, Sir, upon what principle of common ſenſe or juſtice are we to conclude, either that the operations of the war, or the choice of the generals, were directed by you? I have indeed admitted that they were, in the ſame ſenſe as Lewis XIV. was complimented on the actions of a Turenne, a Condé, or a Luxembourg; but I can by no means figure to myſelf, that you had the ſmalleſt excluſive privilege of appointing generals, or that you did any more than fall in with the general bent and opinion of his Majeſty, and your fellow counſellors.

But,

But, ſay your admirers, the plan of the meaſures was yours, your intelligence was exact, preciſe, and extenſive, and there wanted nothing but addreſs and courage to carry your meaſures into execution. Theſe are encomiums I have heard laviſhed upon you in every coffee-houſe, and every corner of a coffee-houſe; our city halls, and even our churches have reſounded with your praiſe; and yet, when we come to what we call cloſe quarters, with how little foundation! Your intelligence with regard to the ſituation and ſtate of Quebec was ſo preciſe and exact, that general Wolfe was as much at a loſs when he came into that river, as he muſt have been, had he arrived on the banks of Styx without a Charon to ferry him over. He ſucceeded, it is true, by one of thoſe very few miracles that are recorded in hiſtory; but can the moſt frontleſs of your admirers who reads his laſt letter to yourſelf, pretend that he ſucceeded by your directions, by your foreſight, or by your diſpoſitions? Had he not ſucceeded, was you not more liable to an impeachment than the Earl

of Oxford was, when one of the charges againſt him was, not for adviſing, but, for not preſenting ſo hair-brained an expedition againſt the very ſame place. To prove what I ſay, let us look into the 17th article of his impeachment, which runs thus, becauſe " He had not (as prime mi-" niſter) adviſed the Queen againſt the " deſtructive expedition to Canada." With regard to your intelligence at Guadaloupe, it was ſo exceſſively exact, that had the French delayed ſigning the capitulation half an hour longer, the conqueſt muſt have been ſnatched out of our hands by a ſuperior force; and yet this is the miniſter who filled our enemy's ports, armies, and navies with his ſpies, and who had intelligence of what was doing even at their council-boards. With regard to Martinico, I ſhall be ſilent, becauſe I do not perceive, either that the conqueſts was made under your auſpices, or that the French were at any pains to defend it, after they had loſt Guadaloupe. With regard to the conqueſt of Belleiſle, it was your plan, and your's only, and long may the

laurels

laurels flouriſh which you gained by the acquiſition. None, I dare to ſay, will attempt to tear them from your temples; it was an exploit that rivals the moſt glorious in antiquity; for I can put none in competition with it, but the famous expedition of Caligula, who, after being at an immenſe expence in his preparations, marched to the ſea-ſide, and ordering his ſoldiers to fill their helmets with cockle-ſhells and periwincles, demanded triumphal honours for returning with the ſpoils of the ocean. This is a ſubject however that is rather too ſerious to be treated ludicrouſly. The expence of Caligula's expedition came out of his own pocket; that of the Belleiſle expedition was defrayed by a people already overburdened with debt. Caligula's conqueſt was bloodleſs; your's, was attended with the loſs of many brave men's lives; his, rendered him the mock of the people of Rome; your's, made you the idol of the mob of England.

Your friends, Sir, pretend to excuſe ſo ſhameleſs a miſapplication, ſo wanton a proſtitution of national power, and nati-

onal

onal treaſure, by pretending that the armament employed againſt Belleiſle was by you intended for another object, that rather than that it ſhould be totally unemployed it was ſent againſt that iſland.

Two conſiderations ariſe from this apology; the firſt is to the total diſcredit of that intelligence and foreſight, aſſigned you by your admirers, as well as your all-directing power in the cabinet. The other conſideration has a much worſe aſpect. If you found, Sir, at the time the expedition againſt Belleiſle was undertaken, that your intereſt in the cabinet was not ſtrong enough to have directed the armament to its firſt object, why did you not *then* reſign the ſeals, *becauſe you could no longer direct the meaſures of government?* You are, perhaps, the firſt miniſter in England that ever preſumed ſo far upon an all-engroſſing power in the adminiſtration, as to diſdain to ſound the ſentiments of your fellow miniſters, or even your fellow counſellors, with regard to the proper object of ſo important an armament. Why, Sir, did you not, before the equipment was made,

made, conſult the judgment of the reſt of the adminiſtration; and had you found it averſe to any violent meaſures with Spain, becauſe matters between the two crowns were not ripe for action, why did you not prevent the nation from being put to a moſt enormous needleſs expence? Before the expedition (I had almoſt called it the fatal one) againſt Belleiſle was undertaken, would it not have been becoming a miniſter of your penetration, to have informed yourſelf with the utmoſt preciſion of the danger, the advantages, the expence, and the conſequences of ſuch an undertaking? Inſtead of that, nothing was to be heard of but that Belleiſle was provided with a road, in which all the navy of England could ride; and when taken, was poſſeſſed of advantages to which all the power of France muſt ſubmit. The public was ſo far impoſed upon by ſuch miſrepreſentations, that our cannons thundered, and our bonfires blazed for an event, that, conſidering the expence of men and money it coſt us, ought to have filled us with ſhame, and covered us with confuſion. Our ſhips were

were without ſhelter, our garriſons without ſuppcrt, our troops without cloathing, and our fellow ſubjects without ſuſtenance upon a bare comfortleſs beach, which equals the horrors of any deſcribed by the moſt diſmal traveller. That I may not ſeem to exaggerate, give me leave to obſerve, that by the 6th article of the ultimatum of France, in reply to that of England, the French are willing to give up to the Engliſh the iſland of Belleiſle, without even making a handle of reclaiming it, as being a conqueſt made after the propoſition of uti poſſidetis had been ſettled. This conceſſion from a people, who never failed to ſnatch at all advantages, is a full proof in what a light this conqueſt was held by the French themſelves.

The other conſideration, Sir, which preſents itſelf on this head is, as I have ſaid, of ſtill worſe aſpect, becauſe it implies not only imprudence, but inhumanity. The equipment had been made, and rather than it ſhould not be employed, it was employed in giving your city friends a holiday, at the expence of almoſt a million

of money, and the blood of many hundred of our fellow ſubjects. Thus, Sir, after your mighty projection had blown into air, your had the pleaſure of giving your grocers, your tobacconiſts, and your other Abel Druggers, the comfort to underſtand, that there was as much of the mighty apparatus ſtill left at the bottom of the pot, as would ſerve to *cure the itch*.

I ſhall now, Sir, take the liberty to examine your adminiſtration by a light, in which, I think, it has not yet been conſidered. But to do that, I muſt appeal to the memories of your friends, and indeed to the teſtimony of the public. I never heard your warmeſt advocates, either in ſpeaking or writing, deny that you ſet out in the beginning of the preſent war upon profeſſed anticontinental principles. You yourſelf, Sir, again and again owned that you did, and the fact is yet uncontradicted, while the only apology which you and your friends can make, for ſo glaring an inconſiſtency, is that you acted according to the beſt of your judgment, but that you ſaw you had reaſon

to alter your ſyſtem: and thus, like another pontiff in politics, you appealed from the pope ill-informed to the pope well-informed, *à patre malè informato ad patrem melius informatum.* I ſhould, Sir, readily admit of your plea, eſpecially as I think, that no pope, either pontifical or political, is infallible, had I reaſon for believing, that you did not originally ſet out in your adminiſtration with a predetermination to carry on the war, as you afterwards did, by plunging us in the abyſs of continental connexions, bloodſhed and diſſipations. I ſpeak it, Sir, with the utmoſt regard for the memory of that auguſt head, whoſe grey hairs went with ſo much honour to the grave, when, I ſay, that he had a natural, and (when it was properly confined) a laudable, prepoſſeſſion in favour of his electoral dominions and native country. In this he was encouraged by the ſyſtem of that ballance of power, which, till it was broken by you, it was our natural intereſt to ſupport; but after you broke it, it was the worſt of madneſs in us to attempt to retrieve.

retrieve. His late Majeſty, however, warm his affections might be for Hanover, never ventured to puſh them farther than he thought the principles of public liberty could admit of, till you, Sir, endeavoured to make him ſenſible, that the ballance of power was a chimera; that Britain was a match for all Europe beſides; and that, with ancient piſtol on her ſide, ſhe might defy the devil and all his works. This was a new doctrine to a king of Great Britain, who till then had always found the limit of his natural affection preſcribed, even by his warmeſt miniſters, with a *Thus, and no farther ſhalt thou proceed.*

Gentlemen may remember how often your friends boaſted, even before your preferment to the ſeals was abſolutely reſolved on, that his late Majeſty often declared, he never had a miniſter whom he perfectly underſtood but you. The meaning of thoſe words came ſoon to be explained. Inſtead of diſplaying your ſcheme at once, you gave us every year *more laſt words* from the throne. The immenſe ſums of eight

or ten millions laviſhed on continental connexions, excluſive of the expences of our ſea war, were to be continued but for one year. Another year brings about the ſame demands, and thoſe were to be the laſt; but at laſt we were fairly told, that the more we granted every year, the nearer we were to the period of our expences. I ſhould not have taken notice of thoſe facts, did they not afford us an inconteſtible evidence how far his Majeſty was impoſed upon, and how artfully he was diverted from following his own inclinations, in reſtoring peace to the continent of Europe; in the ſtile of thoſe quacks, who give a favourable interpretation to every fatal turn which their poiſon brings upon a patient, till, at laſt, he *dies of good ſymptoms*.

All your arts however, Sir, could not ſtifle in his Majeſty's breaſt the dictates of common ſenſe; or, which is the ſame thing, humanity. I ſhall not here take upon me to diſpute, that the diſtreſs, to which the electorate of Hanover was reduced in the year 1757, when the convention

vention of Cloſterſeven was concluded, muſt have been diſagreeable to his late Majeſty. But, Sir, it was far from being diſgraceful; it was far from being fatal to the liberties of Germany, or even to the intereſts of that electorate. His Majeſty viewed it in that light. He was not the firſt prince of the foremoſt rank in hiſtory, who had, through ſuperior force, and prudential conſiderations ſubmitted to the times. He knew it was ridiculous for the French to imagine that they could retain the poſſeſſion of Hanover, and he conſidered it as a depoſit, till it ſhould be reſtored to him by the return of peace. His R. H. had the ſame wiſe moderate ſentiments, and intimated to the Duke de Richelieu, as if a neutrality for Hanover might be deſireable; and the propoſal was backed by the royal authority. Happy had it been for Great Britain, and even for his Pruſſian Majeſty himſelf, notwithſtanding the many miraculous events which afterwards fell out in his favour, had thoſe wiſe moderate counſels prevailed; but their ſucceſs were incompatible with your ſcheme.

You

You repreſented the power and riches of this nation as being inexhauſtible; and capable of buoying up the electorate of Hanover, tho' thrown into floods of affliction, and, to uſe your own expreſſion, with a *milſtone about her neck.*

That this was your way of reaſoning, appears from facts that ſpeak for themſelves. Who was it, Sir, that gave his Pruſſian Majeſty information of ſuch a negotiation being on foot? who adviſed him to ſend the famous reproaching letter to his uncle, upbraiding him——with what?——with an intention of conſulting the good of his electoral, as well as regal dominions, and even with indecent inſinuations againſt his Majeſty's perſon and honour. This letter, it is true, was diſclaimed at the court of Pruſſia, when the writer of it found that he had done wrong in ſuffering it to go abroad; and when he perceived that the Britiſh miniſter had gained ſuch an aſcendant in his maſter's councils, that there was no danger of his Majeſty's inſiſting upon the Hanover neutrality. No formal diſavowal of the letter however

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was ever published by the authority of the English government, but in a counter declaration emitted in the same month of September, his Majesty's electoral ministers, conscious that such a letter was written, use the following expressions. "In such a critical situation, whatever might have been the success of arms, his Majesty is determined steadily to concur with the King of Prussia in the most efficacious measures, for disappointing the iniquities and oppressive designs of their common enemies; and the King of Prussia may assure himself, that the crown of Great Britain will continue religiously to fulfil its engagements with his Prussian Majesty, and support him with vigour and constancy."

Now, Sir, you yourself, who have been in parliament for almost thirty years, and who, I dare to say, has studied the English constitution with the utmost precision, must be sensible, that a British minister is accountable for all the political acts of the king; and if I mistake not, it was upon that very principle of safety, that you

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plauſibly pretended to reſign the ſeals of your office. I ſhall therefore make bold to trouble you with one or two queries, which ariſe from facts well known to all the world. In the firſt place, Sir, what were thoſe engagements with the King of Pruſſia, which his Britannic Majeſty was reſolved ſteadily to fulfil? I know of none but a convention, which was from time to time renewed, from the 16th of January, 1756, to the 11th of April, 1757, and the 7th of December the ſame year, and again renewed on the 9th of November, 1759; by which his Pruſſian Majeſty was to receive 670,000 l. on condition of his augmenting his forces, ſo as to act in the moſt advantageous manner for the common cauſe. By the 4th. article of the ſame treaty, "Their high contracting parties moreover engage, viz. on the one part his Britannic Majeſty, both as king, and as elector; and on the other part his Pruſſian Majeſty, not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention whatſoever, with the powers who have taken part in the preſent

preſent war, but in concert; and by mutual conſenting, and expreſly comprehending each other therein."

Now, Sir, you and your friends ſhall have the choice of your weapons. You will not ſurely pretend, that the ſtipulation for the ſubſidy was otherwiſe than annual. Had it been meant for a term of years, it muſt have been declared to have been ſo in the ſame manner, as has been uſual with our other ſubſidiary powers; ſuch as Denmark, Heſſe Caſſel, Hanover itſelf, and Ruſſia. I will allow, that the largeneſs of the ſum might have made us a little cautious with regard to the limitations of the time; but that, Sir, I think is the ſtrongeſt reaſon that can be adduced againſt ſuch continuance, unleſs the purpoſes anſwered the expence.

I am aware of a quibble that has been thrown out by your friends, and thoſe of continental connexions, as if the reciprocality of the terms of neither party making peace without conſent of the other, was to be perpetual, though the ſubſidy w

to be but annual. This argument, Sir, flies in the face of common ſenſe. The convention is plainly for a ſubſidy, and the condition annexed moſt certainly determines with the payment of that ſubſidy; and is no farther binding, than for the time the ſubſidy is paid. But granting there was any thing in this argument, (the moſt ſhameful ſurely that ever was, though great conſequences depend on it) how can it account for our continuing our expenſive engagement for one year after the pecuniary ſtipulation was ſatisfied. I can perceive in the convention nothing that we was to furniſh the king of Pruſſia with but money; nor can I find any one article ſtipulated in our favour, but his obligation to receive that money. Had we withdrawn the payment, what muſt have become of the convention. But the abſurdity does not end here.

Pray, Sir, what was Great Britain to have in return for this immenſe ſubſidy, or what advantages were ſhe to reap from the engagement of his Pruſſian majeſty, ſtipulated in the third article for augmenting

augmenting his forces? Were the forces to be employed againſt the enemies of Great Britain? No ſuch thing is pretended; then to what purpoſe were they to be employed? Againſt the enemies of Pruſſia, or, if your pleaſe, Sir, the enemies of that very electorate, which might have been neutral, had it not been for the rage of a certain perſon, for engroſſing power at the expence not only of good policy, but of common humanity.

After ages will have difficulty to believe, that this nation could for ſeven years ſubmit to pay an annual ſubſidy, the whole amounting to four millions ſix hundred ninety thouſand pounds, without our receiving from it the ſmalleſt compenſation in trade, in territory, or in honour. But even this is not all; we filled the fields of Germany with our armies, while our own fields were lying uncultivated for want of hands; and ſince our firſt fatal embarkation for that continent, we have, without any viſible Britiſh purpoſe, buried more men, and ſpent more money, than, if rightly applied, would have left us no-

thing more to fear, and hardly more to hope for, in any part of the world. You and your friends, Sir, I know pretend, that the general intereſt of Europe required our taking a ſhare in the German war, and our ſupporting the king of Pruſſia. I admit it; but that concern and that ſupport ought to have been bounded by reaſon. We were, by ſtill ſtronger ties, obliged to aſſiſt Hanover, while Hanover could be aſſiſted; but were we obliged to pluck her up by the locks from floods of perdition, at the hazard of ourſelves ſinking along with her?

In fact, Sir, the whole ſyſtem of the German war, ſo far as Great Britain was concerned in it, was begun and continued upon wrong principles. The convention between his Pruſſian majeſty and us has nothing in it that anſwers the title; it evidently is a convention between two foreign powers, without the leaſt regard to the concerns of Great Britain; nor can I figure to myſelf the ſmalleſt advantage we could have reaped from it, tho' all its purpoſes had been fully anſwered,

farther

farther than to have reinſtated Hanover in the condition ſhe was in when our war with France broke out, and to have defended Sileſia for his Pruſſian majeſty. As to Hanover, nothing can be more certain, than that a neutrality was offered her again and again by the court of France, and the rejecting that neutrality annihilated her importance in the empire; ſo that all ſhe now retains is a mere phantom of independency, without money, without means, and without nerves to ſupport it: inſomuch that, for theſe three years paſt, Hanover can ſcarcely be ſaid to have been an object of the French arms. Thoſe calamities, Sir, are owing to your policy, which prevented her embracing neutrality, that, though attended, perhaps, with ſome inconveniencies, would have left her, upon the whole, no worſe at leaſt than we found her.

With regard to his Pruſſian majeſty, notwithſtanding all the pains he has taken in his adduction of proofs, that there was a ſettled plan formed againſt him by the houſe of Auſtria, the empreſs of Ruſ-

ſia,

ſia, and the elector of Saxony; yet I cannot perceive, that the public is at all agreed as to the juſtice of his irruption into Saxony. It is well known, that his late Majeſty loudly diſapproved of it, till your politics, Sir, found means to reconcile it to common juſtice, and to obliterate in his royal mind the remembrance of all the groſs inſults, which that monarch at a certain time offered to his perſon, both as king and elector.

But, Sir, what dreadful conſequence could have happened to Great Britain, or the ballance of power in Germany, had his Pruſſian Majeſty even loſt Sileſia? It is true, we were obliged to guaranty the poſſeſſion of it to him; but that guaranty was forced upon his late Majeſty to ſave the houſe of Auſtria from perdition; neither ought it ever to have operated in a caſe of offence; all guaranties being in their own nature merely defenſive. Let us therefore ſuppoſe, for argument ſake, that when the tide of ſucceſs turned againſt his Pruſſian Majeſty after the battle of Cölin, that her Hungarian Majeſty had

been

been ſuffered to repoſſeſs herſelf of Sileſia. What fundamental revolution muſt that have introduced in the ſyſtem of Europe? Was public liberty more endangered by the houſe of Auſtria (who had poſſeſſed that dutchy for ages) regaining it, than by the houſe of Brandenburgh retaining it? Or was the difference worth five millions ſterling to Great Britain? Did we ever feel any bad effects ariſing to us by Sileſia being in the hands of the houſe of Auſtria? Did we ever feel any good ones by its being in thoſe of the houſe of Brandenburgh?

It appears, Sir, from his Pruſſian Majeſty's letter, which I have already mentioned, and which never was contradicted by the court of London, nor by the courts of Berlin or Hanover, till after the Hanoverians had reſolved to reſume their arms, and to break through the convention of Cloſterſeven, that his Pruſſian Majeſty was encouraged by the Britiſh miniſtry to break off his connexions with France. But were there no authenticity in that letter, the matter of fact is notorious, and that our

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magnificent promiſes induced that monarch to abandon his natural connexions with France, for ſo I muſt call them, in oppoſition to the houſe of Auſtria. Now, Sir, let us a little conſider in what manner the ſyſtem of Germany muſt have been affected, had Pruſſia and France remained united. We cannot with any ſhew of common ſenſe pretend, that if the Queen of Hungary and her allies, as his Pruſſian Majeſty ſtrenuouſly contends for, formed a deep, reſolute, plan, for ſtripping Pruſſia of Sileſia, there ever could have been a conjunction between the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria; no, Sir, that conjunction was formed by the magnificent promiſes that clenched our alliance with his Pruſſian Majeſty. If then our real deſign was to have preſerved him in poſſeſſion of Sileſia, we took the worſt way in the world to effect it, by detaching him from a natural ally, who could cheaply and effectually have ſerved him; and by taking upon ourſelves a burden, under which we have ſtaggered ever ſince, and which muſt have been totally ineffectual, had it not been

been for the accidental event of the late Czarina's death.

It is admitted, that France attacked Hanover on account of her American quarrel with us; but it is next to certain, that had it not been for our alliance with Pruſſia, Hanover muſt have been defended by the houſe of Auſtria, the Czarina, and the princes of the empire, who have been ſince confederated againſt her. Your intelligence, Sir, I am afraid was very defective, if you imagined that his Pruſſian Majeſty's alliance was any great acquiſition to Great Britain, after he was detached from France. He was conſcious that he was then totally undone without our ſubſidy, and without our army to ſupport him. This I believe was more than you either knew or ſuſpected. But his Ruſſian Majeſty was in the ſecret; he knew the connexions, perſonal as well as political, that ſubſiſted between the two empreſſes, and he knew at the ſame time, that they were indiſſoluble. The event juſtified his foreſight; and in fact, we abandoned the defence of Hanover for that of Pruſſia.

What was France to do upon her loſing the only natural ally ſhe had in the empire, but to look out for others who would ſupport her in her quarrel againſt Great Britain? She preſumed; and ſhe preſumed rightly, that we would make the quarrel of Hanover our own; and ſhe proceeded on a plan, that evinced ſhe was reſolved to make no diſtinction between the King of Great Britain and the elector of Hanover. This, Sir, ought, inſtead of engaging us wholly in the ſupport of Hanover, to have been our ſtrongeſt inducement to have left it to the houſe of Auſtria and the princes of the empire, as it moſt certainly would have been, had not Pruſſia been our ally. In that caſe, the war between the two houſes of Auſtria and Brandenburgh might indeed have gone on, but it never could have affected either Great Britain or Hanover, nor had it not been for the conjunction between us and his Pruſſian Majeſty, could it ever have entered into the heads of the two empreſſes, or their allies, to have given up Hanover.

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This conjunction reverſed the true intereſts of Hanover, as it drew from her a protection, under which ſhe muſt have been ſafe againſt all the power of France, and gave her an ally who could not ſupport himſelf; not to mention the effuſion of blood and treaſure, by our carrying over, ſupporting, maintaining, and recruiting five and twenty thouſand Britiſh troops in Germany. When I ſay this, Sir, I would not be underſtood as if I meant that Great Britain ought not to have contributed, and that largely too, to the defence of Hanover, I mean in money, but to uſe your own expreſſion, *not by ſending a ſingle battallion out of this country.*

This naturally brings me to examine the reaſons, you and your friends have given for your altering ſo totally, as you did, the plan of your conduct. A certain French nobleman, who is now at this court, can (if he pleaſes) tell you how extremely deſirous his Pruſſian Majeſty, at the beginning of this war, was, to retain the friendſhip of France. He even made a merit of tranſmitting to the French court a de-

claration, that he " flattered himſelf with having done the King of France a moſt diſtinguiſhed ſervice, in detaching Auſtria from the alliance of England, that, ſo far from cramping his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's operations againſt the Engliſh, he has procured him a greater facility to puſh them with vigour, by ſtopping the Ruſſians, their common enemies. His Chriſtian Majeſty has therefore nothing to do, but to alter his project of carrying the war into the electorate of Hanover; a change in the plan of his military operations, ſo much the more eaſy, for that the guarantee of the Low Countries was not included in that of the electorate."

This, give me leave, Sir, to ſay it, was an honeſt and a ſenſible declaration, when we conſider his Pruſſian Majeſty in the light of a German patriot, zealous for the independency of his country, and for ſhutting the doors of it in the teeth of all invaders. But in what light muſt it appear to a Britiſh patriot? His Pruſſian Majeſty had a deep inveterate quarrel with the houſe of Auſtria, and he knew it to be irreconcileable

reconcileable by all the powers of negotiation. It was therefore his intereſt to break the connexions between the houſe of Auſtria and Great Britain, its principal ſupport, and thereby he ſerved both his moſt Chriſtan Majeſty and himſelf. The Duke de Nivernois, Sir, is not inſenſible that this plan of his Pruſſian Majeſty, when he returned from his embaſſy at Berlin, was far from being diſreliſhed at the court of France, and had it been thoroughly adopted, the continent of Europe, long before this time muſt have been in a ſtate of tranquility, but that was not the view of your adminiſtration. His Pruſſian Majeſty muſt be tempted by a ſubſidy greater than all the reſt of his revenues, to fall upon the houſe of Auſtria; an undertaking highly agreeable both to his inclination and intereſt, tho' it is perhaps impoſſible to reconcile it to ours. From that inſtant he abandoned his former ſyſtem, and obliged France and Auſtria to coaleſce. By this conduct, Hanover was deprived of its natural protectors, and Great Britain was

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ſaddled with the whole expence, danger, and loſs of defending it.

But we are, all this time, it ſeems, reaſoning in the dark. You had a deeper ſcheme in the tergiverſation of your maxims, for you perceived by experience, that America only could be conquered in Germany. Ridiculous as this apology is for your apoſtacy, it has been ſo warmly adopted, and urged by you and your advocates, that I ſhall treat it with ſome degree of ſerious conſideration. Which was the moſt important object, Sir, to the French; the more than doubtful recovery of the electorate of Hanover, already exhauſted, impoveriſhed and pillaged; defended by ſeventy thouſand men, five and twenty thouſand of whom were Engliſh, and by ſtill more powerful enemies, cold and hunger, or the defence of their poſſeſſions in America, and the Weſt Indies? Had the French entertained the ſmalleſt hope, of being able to repair the firſt blows with which we gave their marine there, could any thing in Germany, have been an object for em-

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ploying their arms? But let us examine facts in their natural order.

In the beginning of the years 1755, the French ſent off from Breſt to America, all the forces that they had ſhipping to carry; and they were ſufficient for diſappointing, that year, our projected expedition againſt fort du Queſne. We ſucceeded however, June the 16th, againſt the French fort at Beauſejour, and all Nova Scotia fell into our hands. We likewiſe defeated, September the 7th, the French general Dieſkau, tho' we failed in our deſign againſt Crown Point through the lateneſs of the ſeaſon, and Braddock was defeated and killed, July the 9th. By this time, viz. June 10th, the admirals Boſcawen and Moſtyn, who had been ſent with a ſquadron to intercept a freſh embarkation of the enemy's troops, took two French men of war of the line, on the coaſt of America. Theſe, Sir, are events that did not properly fall under what is called your adminiſtration, tho' they are immediately connected with thoſe that did, and to which I ſhall now paſs.

You

You was on the 27th of June, 1757, reſtored to the ſeals, and you was heard more than once, to expreſs your approbation of Lord Loudon being appointed to the command of the land forces, and admiral Holbourne to thoſe of the ſea, that were ſent againſt Louiſbourg, tho' both of them had been appointed during the late adminiſtration. Had you found any exceptions to thoſe appointments, you had full time to have altered them, becauſe it was the 9th of July, before the ſea and the land forces effected their junction at Hallifax; and it was not till above a month after, that the expedition was laid aſide upon intelligence that 17 French ſhips of the line, laden with all kinds of military ſtores and ammunition, got into Louiſbourg. I ſhall not purſue the detail of what followed, but only muſt obſerve, that on the 27th of July, 1758, we became maſters of Louiſbourg, by which the French were in fact cut off from their cod-fiſhery, and at the ſame time we deſtroyed the iſland of St. John's, and all their other ſtations on that coaſt; by which

which the French could land troops, ſo as to ſuccour Canada; nay, their ſhips ſtole out of the river St. Laurence, and joined their ſquadron under Monſieur Bompart in the Weſt-Indies.

Such, Sir, was the ſtate of the war in America, during the year 1758, at a time, and in a country, when the moſt conſummate impudence itſelf cannot pretend, that the operations in Germany had the ſmalleſt influence upon our conqueſts in America. When Boſcawen took Louiſbourg, the French were in full vigour on the continent of America. He ſailed for Halifax on the 19th of February, 1758. He had under his command 151 ſhips, and the land troops amounted to 14,000 men, and the garriſon, who were made priſoners of war, amounted to 5637. It is remarkable, that all this time, Canada received no kind of reinforcement or aſſiſtance from the French, tho' their ſquadron which returned from America to Breſt carried 1474 guns.

While affairs were in this proſperous ſituation in America, the French neither

attempted nor intended to ſuccour Canada, or their ſettlements on the continent of America, which they thought were ſecure againſt all attacks, and our diſpoſitions againſt Canada were ſuch, as all the force of France in America could not have diſappointed, conſidering the vaſt ſuperiority of our naval force in thoſe ſeas. But the truth is, the French had now in their eye an affair of greater importance than the defence even of Canada itſelf; and that was a deſcent upon Great Britain. By this time, however, the ſtate of affairs in the cabinet portended a total alteration. Continental meaſures had got the aſcendency there; and you yourſelf, Sir, muſt have found it impracticable to perſevere even in the practice of diſſimulation. You threw off the maſk at laſt, and after America was, in fact, ſubdued, you declared, that it could not be done without employing five and twenty thouſand Britiſh troops upon the continent of Germany, and ſinking above ſix millions of money yearly there. Let any one compare dates and facts, and there cannot be the leaſt diſ-

pute on that head. His Majeſty, at opening the ſeſſion of parliament, which began December the firſt, 1757, recommended as the great objects, which he had at heart, the preſervation of the Proteſtant religion, and the liberties of Europe; and, in that view, to adhere to and encourage his allies, particularly the king of Pruſſia, who ſhould be ſupported in ſuch a manner as his magnanimity and active zeal deſerve. By thoſe expreſſions which followed his Pruſſian majeſty's victory at Roſbach, it was plainly diſcoverable, that the German intereſt had now the aſcendancy in the cabinet; and the ſupplies voted for the enſuing year to German troops and meaſures, amounted to one million eight hundred ſixty one thouſand eight hundred and ninety ſeven pounds, while the expences of our own war, and for defending ourſelves, amounted to eight millions two hundred and eight thouſand three hundred and ſeven pounds, beſides four hundred and ſixteen thouſand pounds granted for deficiencies, repairs, &c. the total ſum being, within a trifle, of

ten millions and an half. All this, Sir, was granted at a ſeaſon when it was impoſſible for the French to have employed a ſingle ſhip to ſave Canada, or their ſettlements on that continent, and when their whole attention was employed upon invading Great Britain. We had, at that time, above twenty five thouſand of their moſt uſeful ſubjects and ſailors priſoners here; and, excepting the ſhips and tranſports, which they intended to employ againſt this nation, it was not in their power to have carried over three hundred men to America. This obſervation holds equally ſtrong with regard to the reduction of Guadaloupe and Martinico; for though, when the latter was reduced, they had laid aſide their projects of invaſion, yet it is well known, that their marine was then almoſt totally annihilated.

From this review, Sir, I hope your friends and you will be candid enough to acknowledge, Firſt, that the immenſe expence of blood and treaſure, which we poured out in Germany, neither did nor could, in the leaſt degree, operate in A-

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merica, farther than by diverting from it the troops and money that might have been more uſefully employed there. Secondly, that you never did make the American war your primary object. And, thirdly, that the fear of loſing your power in the cabinet, by a ſuperior German intereſt, obliged you to pull off the maſk, and to avow thoſe meaſures which you had always ſecretly abetted; but which you were now forced openly to purſue.

Such was the infatuation of the public in your favour, that ſome applauded, ſome pitied, and a few blamed, you. But, upon the whole, no abatement of your miniſterial influence was ſenſibly perceived, for ſome time after the acceſſion of his preſent Majeſty; and, perhaps, no miniſter ever had ſuch fair play as you had from all parties. It was not, however, to be ſuppoſed, that, after all the purpoſes, or, at leaſt, all the declared ones of our vaſt expence were anſwered, that we were to go on in the ſame ruinous track; nor indeed, when the negotiation carried on by Mr. Stanley and Monſieur

ſieur Buſſy was opened, had your character ſuffered in the eye of the public. The gentlemen who had been the moſt averſe to continental meaſures, would have winked at the futility of your apologies, and ſeemed willing to forget and forgive. But moderate meaſures were far from being your aim; and tho' conveniency obliged you to make two great conceſſions, thoſe of giving up Guardaloupe, and allowing the French a liberty to fiſh on the banks of Newfoundland; yet you ſoon perceived, that you could not, at once, retain your power and your popularity. You ſaw, that it was merely in tenderneſs to the peace of the public, that you was indulged in the exerciſe of the former; and you began to perceive, that the other tottered through the conceſſions you had made.

Give me leave, Sir, to ſpeak candidly. You know that you had no longer that radical influence which you poſſeſſed during the late adminiſtration, and rather than abandon it, you reverted to popularity even with ſome ſmall inconſiſtency in your character, by pretending to be aſham-

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ed, and to repent of the conceſſions you had made. Every part of your conduct was ſuited now to court the populace. The fooliſh ſimple paper, for it could be called no other, which Buſſy preſented during the courſe of the negotiation, deſiring that his Catholic Majeſty's claims and intereſt might be conſulted in it, gave you full room for diſplaying your patriotiſm, by treating both kings in a manner that perhaps never was heard of before, towards powers not abſolutely reduced. And yet this haughtineſs, raſh and inconſiderate as it may ſeem, was the moſt politic meaſure you ever purſued. You were ſenſible, nor did you conceal it, that the courts of Madrid and Verſailles were now in perfect good underſtanding with one another; and that this union muſt in the end, if not in the progreſs of it, break your power. You, therefore, conſulted with yourſelf in what manner to make your bows, and to retire before you ſhould be turned out. The family compact preſented itſelf, and was, before the contents of it were known, repreſented

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by you as being big with ſuch deſtruction to this kingdom, as to require an immediate declaration of war againſt Spain. You did not indeed venture to point out particulars; but you attempted to bring your fellow counſellors, as well as the public, into an implicit belief of your dictates. You was hampered in your own ſnare. Some miniſters were in the cabinet, who were as well inſtructed as yourſelf in the mighty ſecret, and who knew that if there was the leaſt danger in the family compact, it could ariſe only by your continuing in power, and by perſevering in the abſurdity of your conduct, and the inſolence of your behaviour. They gave you line however, and without offering to pull the hook, you fairly daſhed into a reſignation; but upon what a ridiculous pretext, let any man judge who has read this boaſted compact. In ſhort, Sir, when you ſaw that you could no longer withſtand the torrent that was ready to break upon you, you dived below it, and by the favour of a maſter who loved his people too well to endanger the peace of the

public,

public, you was ſuffered to retire from buſineſs with moſt diſtinguiſhing marks of royal indulgence and bounty.

I ſhall juſt only mention the two pretexts which you made for your reſignation. One was, that you was no longer ſuffered to guide the affairs of government; the other, that you differed from the reſt of the council, with regard to the affairs of Spain. Who, Sir, that reads the firſt excuſe can imagine you to have been any other than a vizir, to whom an indolent grand ſignior had remitted the reins of government; for the ſucceſsful management of which you was anſwerable with your head? If future times ſhould peruſe ſuch an apology, will it not be natural for the readers to aſk: Whether Great Britain at that time was not governed by a prince who was in a ſtate of inſanity, infancy, or dotage? But to put the matter on a fair iſſue, I ſhall take the liberty to vindicate his Majeſty and your fellow counſellors ſo far, as to call publickly upon you to know, what ſingle meaſure you guided, in which the reſt of the board had not, if

they pleaſed to have exerted it, a negative? Many meaſures may occur in government, of ſo trifling importance, that it is not worth while to break the unity of a council board by any difference upon them. But it was very plain, that when an affair of importance occurred, you, Sir, was not ſuffered to dictate; but was controuled. It was then ſeen, that neither your Sovereign nor your fellow miniſters were cyphers in the government; and had you not taken advantage of the very pauſe you ſeized, you perhaps could have had no pretext for uſing the word RESIGNATION.

As to the affairs of Spain, your boaſted diſcovery of the family compact was a mere evaſion. That compact is as harmleſs as any meaſure can be entered into amongſt ſovereigns, who are apprehenſive of being obliged to receive the law from a haughty, overbearing, miniſter, without any other reaſon but the *ſic volo*. It was then time, Sir, to ſhew the crown of Spain, that his Majeſty was governed by principles of juſtice and moderation; that he

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was not to give way to a torrent of impetuous paſſion; that you had at leaſt equals in his cabinet, and by well judged experience, ſuperior in his favour.

In the mean while, it is to be lamented, that you had ſo long time to ſport with the paſſions of the people, by throwing out the baits of pernicious conqueſts, and unimportant victories. What purpoſe, Sir, can our acquiſitions, were they ten times greater than they are, ſerve? Were I to ſpeak my own mind I think they muſt ruin us, in the ſame manner as a trader or ſhopkeeper is ruined by overdealing himſelf. The very houſe and ſhop rent we pay muſt ſink us in the end. Conſider, Sir, that by a moderate eſtimate, every fifth (I had almoſt ſaid) every fourth able-bodied man in Great Britain is either a ſoldier or a ſailor in his Majeſty's ſervice. We have not in the united kingdoms ſeven millions of inhabitants. Of thoſe, one half are women; and of the remainder, I ſhall even admit one half to be capable of bearing arms. This, Sir, brings the number of fighting

men amongſt us, to be about one million ſeven hundred and fifty thouſand; which divided by five will anſwer to pretty near the number of men employed in the war.

I know, Sir, that ſome advantage may be taken of this eſtimate; becauſe the number of ſailors and ſoldiers do not riſe ſo high. But give me leave to obſerve, that the paper kite tail is of a monſtrous extent. The dependents upon war, ſuch as tranſports, commiſſaries, ſutlers, with a long train of et ceteras, are hardly to be eſtimated; and including workmen at a moderate computation, their numbers amount to very near one half of the real ſoldiers and ſailors employed.

How long do you or your friends imagine, Sir, can a nation like this, which ſince the beginning of the preſent war has loſt above one hundred and fifty thouſand hands, continue to afford ſuch an expence of blood? I will venture to ſay, not for two years, if our conqueſts ſhould continue. Let a man, who has ever ſo little ſkill in figures, ſit down with pen and ink, and calculate how many hands, com-

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merce, agriculture, and manufactures employ in this nation, he will find, that for five years paſt, we have not been able to ſupply the proper numbers, without raiſing the price of labour to ſo exceſſive a rate, as amounts almoſt to a prohibition in many branches of buſineſs. This is not all; there is ſcarcely a conqueſt we have made that is not at this very time poſſeſſed by our natural enemies. What muſt the caſe be, when thoſe conqueſts come to be peopled, ſo as to render them of ſervice to the mother country. Shall we unpeople England to make England; or, as the ſaying is, *are we to built London out of London.* Look round this nation, and let me aſk any reaſonable man, whether we can ſpare more men to the purpoſes, either of war or population? Should it be ſaid that our enemies are equally diſtreſt. I anſwer that is falſe. Their trade is indeed ruined, and their finances are exhauſted. But they can lye by for as many years as we can do months; it is true private adventurers muſt be hurt, but the numbers of their fighting men are ſtill undiminiſhed,

diminiſhed; and France, long before ſhe had her Weſt-India trade, was as powerful, I had almoſt ſaid more ſo, as ſhe is at preſent. Where was her foreign commerce under her Richelieus and Mazarines, or when Lewis the 14th filled every corner of Europe with terror and diſmay? Colbert was the firſt miniſter that inſpired her government with the notion of applying her marine to the extention of her colonies, and yet a right Frenchman is, at this very time, of opinion, that in ſo doing, Colbert miſtook the true principles of French greatneſs. I ſhall not however enter into any diſcuſſion of that point. All that I would infer, is, that France within herſelf, by the advantages of her ſituation and climate, would be a great and powerful kingdom, tho' her commerce to the Eaſt and Weſt Indies ſhould not bring her in a ſhilling a year. In this ſhe indiſputably has an advantage over England. France could trade all over Europe, tho' ſhe had not a ſhip of burden. Great Britain without ſhipping can have no trade, and ſcarcely any exiſtence. We proceed on falſe and

frivolous

frivolous notions, when we talk of ruining the French by deſtroying their commerce. If we have commerce of our own, the French muſt, and always will have a ſhare of it. What is commerce, but an intercourſe of the commodities of life? If ſuch an intercourſe does not ſubſiſt, let us bring to our warehouſes all the treaſure and trade of the two Indies, and we muſt be ruined?

Suppoſing therefore, Sir, that this war ſhould go on, and that we are ſucceſsful in it to the utmoſt extent of our wiſhes, by ſtripping France of every foot ſhe has in America. What muſt be the conſequence, but a general combination againſt us of all the nations in Europe without regard to property or principles? Every port muſt be ſhut againſt us, and every people our foes. But it may be ſaid, if the American and Weſt-India trades are intirely our own, what muſt the reſt of Europe do? Better perhaps than they do now. Diſtreſs and avarice will catch hold of private traders, and we ſhall ſoon become a nation of ſmugglers. This is a truth too wofully

fully confirmed by experience. What has the Spaniards gained by monopolizing their gold? Have they not been reduced to conſider it as a mere material, that is to be changed for other materials of more value and uſe in life? Should we monopolize the ſugar and the fiſh trades, the caſe would be the ſame; our enemies would ſtill be ſupplied with ſugar, and fiſh by ſmugglers, at a cheaper rate than they could be by fair traders.

I am far, Sir, from pretending to be in the ſecret of the negotiation, I ſhall therefore take it upon the common footing, that we are to reſtore Guadaloupe and Martinico, and to grant the French a liberty of fiſhing and drying their fiſh on the banks of Newfoundland; while we are to have the ceſſion of Louiſiana, and the free navigation of the Miſſiſippi. Now, Sir, without entering upon particulars, or a diſagreeable detail of the vaſt expences which our conqueſts and the war have occaſioned, I ſhall put it to the breaſt of every man of honour and principle, whether, ſituated as this nation is at preſent,

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at war with the two greateſt powers in Europe, the ſtrength of the one almoſt undiminiſhed, and that of the other daily recruiting, the difference between what you was willing to accept of, and what the French are willing to give, can create with any reaſonable perſon an hour's heſitation, when put in ballance with the benefits of peace? That the complection of the war has of late changed in the favour of our enemy, ſeems by no means improbable, whatever the fate of the Havannah may be. To what, Sir, was that owing, but to your dragging Spain into a war, which every principle of intereſt and inclination directed her to avoid. With regard to our log-wood trade, ſhe had made conceſſions, which no private gentleman, conſidering the whole of it is upon indulgence, could find fault with. As to the right of her ſubjects fiſhing on the banks of Newfoundland, ſhe does not ſeem ever to have been in earneſt. The advantages we have gained over France are ſufficiently acknowledged, and are as honourable as they are advantageous; nor

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can they ever be fruſtrated but by our departing from the principles of juſtice and moderation, and by our forgetting the precept of one of the greateſt men of antiquity, *to make a bridge of gold to a flying enemy.* I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your moſt devoted humble Servant.

P. S. Our acquiſition of the Havannah, the news of which arrived ſince this letter was finiſhed, makes no manner of alteration in the general courſe of the reaſoning contained in it, as the reader may eaſily ſee, that the whole is built on a ſuppoſition, that the place muſt ſooner or later become ours.

FINIS.